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ABSTRACT
Now that so much of collective action takes place online,
web-generated data can further understanding of the mechan-
ics of Internet-based mobilisation. This trace data offers so-
cial science researchers the potential for new forms of analy-
sis, using real-time transactional data based on entire popula-
tions, rather than sample-based surveys of what people think
they did or might do. This paper uses a ‘big data’ approach
to track the growth of over 8,000 petitions to the UK Gov-
ernment on the No. 10 Downing Street website for two years,
analysing the rate of growth per day and testing the hypoth-
esis that the distribution of daily change will be leptokurtic
(rather than normal) as previous research on agenda setting
would suggest. This hypothesis is confirmed, suggesting that
Internet-based mobilisation is characterized by tipping points
(or punctuated equilibria) and explaining some of the volatil-
ity in online collective action. We find also that most suc-
cessful petitions grow quickly and that the number of signa-
tures a petition receives on its first day is a significant factor
in explaining the overall number of signatures a petition re-
ceives during its lifetime. These findings have implications
for the strategies of those initiating petitions and the design
of web sites with the aim of maximising citizen engagement
with policy issues.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly collective action is occurring online; most mo-
bilisations include an online element and some take place al-
most wholly online. All this web-based activity leaves a dig-
ital footprint, which allows researchers to generate real-time
transactional data of political behaviour. This kind of data
represents a shift for social science research, with a move
away from sample-based survey data about what people think
they did or will do, to transactional data about what people
actually did based on whole populations [15, 8]. Yet the me-
chanics of online collective action—and the extent to which
the rise of the phenomenon challenges existing theories and
understanding of collective action behaviour and leads to new
models of contemporary political behaviour—remain under–
analysed. We are still at the start of exploiting the great po-
tential of ‘big data’ to understand the mechanics of online
collective action.
This paper analyses a ‘big data’ set of all online petitions
submitted to No. 10 Downing Street website from February
2009 to March 2011 (a screenshot of the webpage is shown
in Figure 1). The petitions site was first launched in Novem-
ber 2006, and over the course of its lifetime it received more
than 8 million signatures from over 5 million unique email
addresses.1 While live, the site allowed anyone to view pe-
titions, and any user with a valid email address could create
a new petition or sign an existing petition. The government
promised an official response to all petitions receiving at least
500 signatures, providing an internal definition for the ‘suc-
cess’ of a petition. This paper analyses the growth of petitions
and the distinctive characteristics of the mobilisation curves
of successful and unsuccessful petitions. First, we provide
some background on online collective action in general and
e-petitions in particular. We use previous work on collective
action and political attention to develop a hypothesis regard-
ing the development of online mobilisations: that they will
be characterised by long periods of stasis and short periods
of rapid change, leading to a leptokurtic distribution of daily
change. Second, we outline the methods used to test this hy-
pothesis and third, provide the results, followed by a discus-
sion of the policy and design implications of the findings.
BACKGROUND
The 21st century has seen a rise in mobilisation, from the
dramatic events in authoritarian states of the Arab Spring,
to a series of protests, demonstrations and social backlash
against austerity driven cutbacks and state retrenchment in
1http://www.mysociety.org/projects/
no10-petitions-website/
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Figure 1. No. 10 Downing Street petition website (no longer available)
liberal democracies facing the consequences of the financial
crash of 2008. The web is implicated—to a larger or lesser
extent—in virtually all these events. Researchers have turned
their attention to the theoretical and conceptual implications
of online collective action (e.g. [5, 16]) and some are using
innovative methods, including experiments and data-mining,
to explore the spread of mobilisations across online social
networks (see, for example, [1, 9, 12, 11, 4, 2]).
While online activity may be a minor element of some mobili-
sations, other mobilisations occur almost entirely online. The
trend for ‘e-petitioning’ represents one such activity, where
online petitions are created, disseminated, circulated, and pre-
sented online, and although policy-makers may discuss re-
sponses in offline contexts, such responses are generated and
sent online. The UK government’s e-petition site was created
on the No. 10 Downing Street website in November 2006 and
ran until March 2011, when it was closed by the incoming
Coalition government. Some of these petitions had high pol-
icy impact, notably one against the Labour administration’s
proposed road pricing policy, which policy-makers admitted
off the record played a role in getting the policy scrapped.
A new site was later launched in July 2011 on the direct.gov
portal with a different format. Signing petitions has long been
among the more popular political activities, leading the field
for participatory acts outside voting and with other social ben-
efits ascribed to it as well as having the potential to bring
about policy change; e-petitioning reinforces ‘civic minded-
ness’ [21].
E-petitions are interesting examples of mobilisations with a
strong online imprint, which will include the entire transac-
tion history for both successful and unsuccessful mobilisa-
tions. The data generated from the signing of electronic peti-
tions is an example of what is now commonly known as ‘big
data’, representing a transactional audit trail of what people
actually did (as opposed to what people think they did) and
an entire population (without the need to take a representative
sample). Data like this represents a big shift for social sci-
ence research into political behaviour, which has traditionally
rested on survey data, or, for elections, voting data. Big data
also presents challenges to social science research—it doesn’t
come with handy demographics attached and we do not know
where people came from to any one interaction, nor where
they are going, so it is often difficult to match up online activ-
ities across different platforms, or to identify the underlying
factors influencing behaviour, such as age, income or gender.
This data however, makes it possible to look at the different
patterns of growth in the 8,000 mobilisation curves that we
have and identify the distinctive characteristic of those mo-
bilisations that succeed and those that fail with our digital
hindsight. Such an analysis may tell us something about the
nature of collective action itself in a digital world.
So what would we hypothesise about these mobilisations? A
possible hypothesis may be derived from previous research
on agenda setting in political systems. The most well known
model of how policy attention proceeds in a liberal democ-
racy is that of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, developed by the US
authors Baumgartner and Jones and their ‘Policy Agendas’
programme of research (see www.policyagendas.org). The
theory argues that policy attention to any issue will remain
in long periods of stasis where little change occurs. Where
issues do hit the policy agenda, it will be because some event
has ‘punctuated’ the equilibria, all eyes (including the me-
dia, public opinion, interest groups and politicians concerned)
turn to the issue, money is spent, institutions are created and
policy change occurs [13, 3, 14]. The theory of punctu-
ated equilibria is multi-faceted and has been illustrated by a
range of empirical data across policy areas and within differ-
ent dimensions of attention, such as public opinion, budgetary
change and congressional attention [14] and in various coun-
tries, including the UK [13]. Baumgartner and Jones do not
discuss Internet-related activity to any great degree; however,
we might hypothesise that the pattern of mobilisations around
a petition would proceed in a similar way, thereby contribut-
ing to the same sort of issue attention cycle that has been
observed many times over in agenda setting research. Such
a model would predict that the distribution of daily changes
in attention would be ‘leptokurtic’. Kurtosis is a measure of
the “peakedness” of a distribution, and a distribution with
positive excess kurtosis is said to be leptokurtic. Such dis-
tributions have an acute, slender peak around the mean and
fatter tails. For the distribution of change in petitions data,
this would correspond to a large amount of very little change
(around the mean) with some punctuations of large change
forming the tail of the distribution.
Such a finding could not show any causal effect, as only
the activity of petitioners is being analysed here (and tipping
points could suggest a media effect, although the authors are
not aware of any petition having media coverage prior to hav-
ing amassed a substantive amount of signatures). It could,
however, point towards a role for online mobilisation in pol-
icy change analogous to that of the media in the agenda set-
ting analysis, which is ascribed a lurching effect, due to the
capacity of the media to parallel process only a small number
of issues; at the point at which a punctuation occurs, media
attention will ‘tip over’ from specialist outlets into the main-
stream media. In addition, in lower level mobilisations where
the media is not paying attention, such a finding could suggest
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a role in policy issues below the media radar.
METHODS
The UK Government’s petition website was accessed daily
from 2 February 2009 until March 2011, when the site closed,
with an automated script. Each day, the number of overall
signatures to date on each active petition was recorded. In
addition, the name of the petition, the text of the petition, the
launch date of the petition, and the category of the petition
were recorded. Overall, 8,326 unique petitions were tracked,
representing all publicly available petitions active at any point
during the study.
Petitions on the Number 10 website closed, by default, 12
months after they first launched. To identify patterns in how
petitions grow, the percentage change in new signatures was
calculated each day. Most petitions had a long period of in-
activity prior to their deadline date. To consider just how pe-
titions grow, data was truncated after the last signature on a
petition, removing any final period of zero signature-per-day
growth prior to the petition’s deadline.
Leptokurtic distributions have a more acute peak close to the
mean and larger tails. There is no statistical test to specifi-
cally classify a distribution as leptokurtic. However, several
tests in combination help demonstrate a distribution is lep-
tokurtic (see [13]). The most rigorous test is the Shapiro-
Wilk test [20], which checks whether the points could pos-
sibly be drawn randomly from a normal distribution. Lep-
tokurtic distributions should reject the Shapiro-Wilk null hy-
pothesis of normality. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test tests
that a set of frequencies is normal distributed by focusing on
the skewedness and kurtosis of a distribution [7, pp. 392–4],
and this null hypothesis should be rejected if a distribution is
leptokurtic and hence non-normal. Visualizing the histogram
and the quantile–quantile plot give further evidence of a lep-
tokurtic distribution.
RESULTS
The webcrawler collected all available petitions during the
collection period, resulting in a set of 8,326 unique petitions.
In Figure 2, a Zipfian diagram shows the number of signatures
at the end of data collection period vs rank of the petition
according to the number of signatures. This demonstrates that
most of the petitions receive only a few signatures, and only
a few petitions (6 per cent) make it beyond the 500-signature
threshold. The slop of the Zipf’s law changes around the point
of 500 signatures, indicating that the signatories are less eager
to increase the number of signatures after meeting the number
required for an official government response.
Nearly all of the 534 petitions that succeeded in obtaining
500 or more signatures did so quickly (Figure 3). Successful
petitions took a mean time of 8.4 days to reach 500 signatures,
but a median time of only two days. In fact, 230 of the 534
successful petitions succeeded in obtaining 500 signatures on
the day they were launched (day 1). Only a few petitions
take a much longer time to reach the 500 signature mark: 31
petitions (6 per cent) succeed after taking more than 30 days,
and only five successful petitions in our dataset required more
than four months to reach the 500 signature mark.
Figure 2. Zipfian diagram of the petitions according to the final number
of signatures received by each at the end of the data collection period.
The change in the slope of the Zipf’s law happens at 500 signatures sug-
gesting a threshold effect (lines are to guide the eyes).
Figure 3. Petition Growth, number of signatures received by each peti-
tion as a function of the number of days since its launch. The colour-
coding is according to the final number of signatures.
Histograms of the logarithm of the number of signatures for
petitions at different ages are shown in Figure 4. A fat-tailed
distribution emerges at the very start of the petitions, and as
times passes only the lower bound of the distribution shifts
slightly to larger numbers. The long-term dynamic of petition
growth is seen to have many small changes and a few very
large changes.
Figure 5 shows the percentage change in new signatures ad-
justed so that the mean growth of each petition lies at zero.
While most daily change is small, petitions’ growth is punc-
tuated by a few large changes. The distribution of growth
is leptokurtic and strongly rejects the Shapiro-Wilk null hy-
pothesis of normality with a W statistic of 0.17 translat-
ing to a p-value less than 0.000001. The distribution has a
kurtosis score of 1,445 and a skewedness of 30.53, and re-
jects the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for a normal distribution
(p < 0.0001). When we applied the same tests to the popu-
lation of petitions that were successful in achieving 500 sig-
natures (that is, excluding the unsuccessful ones), we found a
similar leptokurtic distribution (Shapiro-Wilk W statistic of
0.10, p < 0.000001).
The number of signatures a petition received on its first day
has a significant, positive association to the log of the number
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Figure 4. Histogram of the logarithm of the number of signatures for
samples of petitions at different ages (indicated in each panel). The right
tail of the distribution emerges rapidly and as time increases, only the
lower bound moves to right.
of signatures the petition receives in total during its lifetime
(Table 1). In addition, the number of other petitions started
on the same day has a positive and significant regression co-
efficient. The day of the week the petition launched on along
with a simple weekend vs weekday launch distinction (not
shown) were not significant. Certain categories of petitions
were, however, associated with a greater or smaller number
of signatures. In particular, petitions in the Health, well-being
and care category along with those in Environment category
received significantly more signatures, while petitions in the
Government, politics and public administration category re-
ceived significantly fewer signatures. Both the Health and
Environment categories are also significant in a regression on
Figure 5. Log of daily percentage change in number of signatories (cen-
tred around each petition’s mean)
the log of total signatures only including petitions receiving
less than 500 signatures. Overall, petitions tended to grow
shortly after launch and then stop growing. This active pe-
riod of growth for petitions had a mean length of 57 days and
a median length of 27 days.
DISCUSSION
The 500 signatures mark seems at first consideration a very
low threshold that should easily be passed. However, by far
the majority of petitions (94 per cent in this time period) fail
to attain even this modest number of signatures. This illus-
trates the low costs of initiating a collective action (with less
regard to its viability) and the ability of digital trace data to
easily track an entire population of mobilisations (before the
success of each mobilisation is know). Petitions in the dataset
are most active when they are first launched, and most pe-
titions (presumably in the lack of outside stimulus) become
digital dust after a couple of months despite typical deadlines
of one year on the site.
Confirmation of our hypothesis regarding the leptokurtic dis-
tribution of changes to the support for a petition suggests that
in online environments, collective action could play a role
in a punctuated equilibrium model of policy change. That
is, the general pattern for policy attention is for issues to re-
main dormant or in stasis, with a generally low level of atten-
tion. Some issues (by far the minority) that attract attention
quickly gain a ‘critical mass’ of activists and start to vie for
policy attention, joining the range of other institutional in-
fluences in helping to ‘punctuate’ the equilibrium. Such an
argument would not include the claim that the mechanism by
which collective action acts to bring about instability would
be the same as the role played by the media, which plays a dis-
tinctive ‘lurching’ role in Jones and Baumgartner’s analysis,
based in part on the tendency of the media to process a small
number of issues in parallel. In the context studied here, the
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.1253 0.0896 34.89 0.0000
cat: Economics and finance -0.3360 0.0960 -3.50 0.0005 **
cat: Education and skills 0.0775 0.0984 0.79 0.4306
cat: Employment, jobs and careers -0.2278 0.1067 -2.14 0.0328 *
cat: Environment 0.2603 0.0984 2.65 0.0082 **
cat: Government, politics and public administration -0.2444 0.0895 -2.73 0.0063 **
cat: Health, well-being and care 0.2419 0.0860 2.81 0.0049 **
cat: Housing -0.1822 0.1163 -1.57 0.1173
cat: Information and communication -0.0746 0.1269 -0.59 0.5564
cat: International affairs and defence 0.0739 0.1024 0.72 0.4705
cat: Leisure and culture 0.2480 0.1084 2.29 0.0222 *
cat: Life in the community 0.0002 0.1047 0.00 0.9983
cat: People and organisations 0.1670 0.1208 1.38 0.1668
cat: Public order, justice and rights 0.1279 0.0879 1.46 0.1457
cat: Science, technology and innovation 0.3043 0.1654 1.84 0.0659
cat: Transport and infrastructure -0.0669 0.0897 -0.75 0.4561
Start on Monday -0.0033 0.0586 -0.06 0.9557
Start on Tuesday -0.0461 0.0586 -0.79 0.4315
Start on Wednesday -0.0161 0.0591 -0.27 0.7850
Start on Thursday 0.0775 0.0595 1.30 0.1929
Start on Friday -0.0651 0.0602 -1.08 0.2793
Start on Saturday -0.0153 0.0610 -0.25 0.8022
Signatures on Day 1 0.0004 0.0000 28.31 0.0000 **
Number of petitions started on same day 0.0083 0.0020 4.11 0.0000 **
Table 1. Factors affecting growth. Ordinary least squares regression on the log of the total number of signatures
Categories variables are relative to the first category in the list, Business and industry.
** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05
mechanism would depend more on the ways in which a mo-
bilisation is disseminated via online social networks, some-
thing that previous research mentioned in the introduction has
begun to investigate. If such activity tends to take place on the
day the petition is initiated, then these findings could indicate
the importance of achieving some kind of viability signal with
petitioner’s closest contacts right at the start, because initial
rapid growth will have a greater effects on subsequent par-
ticipation decisions by ‘weaker tie’ contacts than a gradual
growth over a prolonged period.
In other empirical studies using experimental methodologies,
we have started to uncover the mechanism behind such punc-
tuations. That is, in addition to the close contacts informed
about the petition directly by the petitioner, other individu-
als (including people unknown to the petitioner or more dis-
tant contacts) deciding whether to participate will be influ-
enced by the information that other people have already par-
ticipated. This influence will depend on the number of other
participants [17], the personality of the individual deciding
whether to participate [18], and the closeness of the individ-
ual to the petitioner. The occurrence of a punctuation will
depend on the existence of ‘starters’ whose thresholds for par-
ticipation are low or whose closeness to the petitioner has in
this instance reduced their threshold for participation. These
starters will act as a signal for people with higher thresholds
and weaker ties to the petitioner to ‘follow’ in signing the
petition, thereby acting as a further signal for people with
even higher thresholds to join. At some point, if the peti-
tion is successful, then the number of followers will reach
‘critical mass’ and attention to the mobilisation will become
widespread, breaking out of the petitioner’s social network
and gain more general social media exposure.
So, there are two possible explanations for the importance
of the first day in achieving the critical mass: first, the way
in which the petition is disseminated via online networks and
second, the dynamic of starters and followers and social infor-
mation about other participants in the burst of activity. If it is
that visitors to the petition are heavily influenced by the num-
bers of other participants that they observe, then the finding
could join those of other work in economics illustrating the
importance of ‘first donations’ in charitable giving [6], show-
ing that early donors set the precedent for later donors, or the
wider literature on conditional co-operation, showing that so-
cial information about the contribution of others influences an
individual participant’s decision to contribute [19, 10]. This
study complements this previous work by focusing on num-
bers of participants, rather than contribution amount (as ev-
eryone’s contribution, at least that we are able to measure, is
the same) and a more explicitly political context, rather than
that of charitable giving.
The strong effect of petitions tending to succeed quickly or
not at all may be influenced by the design of the petition
website during the period of study. For users starting at the
homepage of the site, it was possible to view petitions over-
all or within a specific category and to sort petitions by the
number of signatures or the date added. It was therefore eas-
iest to look at petitions with the largest or smallest number of
signatures and the oldest or newest petitions. It might be pos-
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sible, therefore, that users of the site arriving at the homepage
would only look at the newest petitions or the petitions with
the most signatures contributing to the effects observed. This
influence, however, would not apply to users following links
shared via email and social media, which would point to a
specific petition that the contact was supporting. These alter-
native effects might be tested using an experimental approach
in future research.
CONCLUSIONS
We have found that in online mobilisations, growth tends not
to occur, meaning that most mobilisations that are initiated,
fail. But where it does, it proceeds in rapid bursts followed by
periods of stasis. Such a finding suggests that online mobili-
sations of the kind covered here could play a role in the more
general process of punctuated equilibria in policy-making.
For example, Jones and Baumgartner [14] found a high corre-
lation between public concern on an issue and Congressional
attention. Our findings here could be even more interesting.
In the theory of punctuated equilibrium the media plays a
key role in terms of ‘lurching’ from one issue to another and
having a complex feedback relationship with public opinion.
The sort of mobilisations we are looking at here, however,
are bubbling up relatively independently of the media, gain-
ing media attention only when they obtain significantly high
levels of support—the petition on road-pricing that success-
fully played a role in obtaining policy change, for example,
received a great deal of media attention once that it reached
one million signatories.
Research that develops our understanding of the mechanics
of this turbulence will be important for scholars and policy-
makers alike as collective action continues to move into on-
line settings. If online collective action is characterised by
punctuations, then it looks as if such activity could inject a
further dose of instability into political systems. If mobilisa-
tions follow a pattern of very low levels of attention punctu-
ated by occasional ‘spurts’ which grow rapidly into full scale
mobilisations that merge with other elements of the political
system to push policy change on to the agenda and the insti-
tutional landscape, then we can expect to see increasing tur-
bulence in contemporary politics, adding to the ‘instability’
that Baumgartner and Jones [3, 14] and their co-investigators
have modelled so extensively in previous research.
Our future empirical work will analyse petition growth at a
finer scale: we are currently drawing data from a new UK e-
petitions site on an hourly basis and from a US government
petition website, in order to obtain a more fine-grained and
cross-national analysis of the crucial early days of mobilisa-
tions. Future work will also explore coordination with media
coverage and mentions of the petitions on social networking
sites (such as Facebook and Twitter), work to explicitly model
petition growth curves, and better understand the role of peti-
tion categories. Much of the work on collective action noted
above is based on research into a single platform, whereas any
online activity tends to involve several. By looking carefully
at the timing with which an issue gains attention in different
parts of the political system, including the activist activities
investigated here, we might get closer to establishing some
sort of sequencing of attention. In addition, one way of get-
ting around the lack of causal inference in research of this
kind is to carry out experiments, as in Margetts et al. [17, 18].
The findings presented here seem to illustrate to those initi-
ating petitions, the importance of disseminating a petition to
their ‘strongest’ contacts rapidly; future work using both ‘big
data’ and experimental approaches could further inform the
optimal way that such dissemination should take place.
Future work will also use an experimental approach to anal-
yse the effect of different information environments sur-
rounding petition websites on petition growth. Designers of
web sites that involve civic engagement, such as e-petition
sites, must decide what social information about existing lev-
els of participation to include, for example the numbers of
people who have already signed and the timings of when they
did so. Other design decisions include whether participants
are anonymous or whether their names are made visible, and
whether input from other social media platforms is incorpo-
rated into the petition site. Research of this kind can inform
such design decisions in ways that maximise citizens’ input
to policy debates.
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